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1 Introduction 
Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd1 (Peel) is the second reported judgment to 
deal with the remedy provided for in section 163 (the oppression remedy) of the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act). The Court was confronted with a complex and 
unique set of facts that raised some important questions regarding the application of 
section 163 of the Act and the inherent requirements that need to be satisfied in 
order to entitle applicants to relief in terms this section. 
Although Moshidi J dealt in detail with the provisions of section 163 (he even sought 
assistance from section 232 of the Australian Corporations Act 50 of 2001 and 
section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act RSC 1985 c C-44), with 
respect, we do not agree with his finding that the applicants in casu proved that a 
result had manifested and that the result was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to 
them, or that the result unfairly disregarded their interests, as required by section 
163(1) of the Act. We agree with the respondents that "the applicants [had] failed to 
bring themselves within the requirements of the section"2 and we disagree with the 
Court "that the applicants [had] succeeded to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that they … [were] entitled to the relief".3 
∗  HGJ Beukes. BIuris LLB (PUCHE) LLM (Unisa). Senior Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, 
Unisa, South Africa. E-mail address: beukehgj@unisa.ac.za. 
∗∗  WJC Swart. Bcom (Law) LLB LLM (UP). Senior Lecturer, Department of Mercantile Law, Unisa, 
South Africa. E-mail: swartwjc@unisa.ac.za. 
1  Peel v Hamon J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 SA 331 (GSJ) (Peel). 
2  Peel para [27]. 
3  Peel para [70]. 
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2 The facts 
The dispute between the applicants and respondents arose from the discovery, after 
the formation of a joint venture company incorporated and registered as Hamon J&C 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd (Hamon J&C; the first respondent), of certain transactions 
concluded before the formation of Hamon J&C. 
The formation of Hamon J&C resulted from a sale and transfer agreement between 
the applicants (all of whom were shareholders of J&C Engineering (Pty) Ltd (J&C)) 
and Hamon South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Hamon SA; the second respondent), concluded 
during October 2010,4 effective 1 October 2010 (para 12). The sale and transfer 
agreement between the applicants and Hamon SA entailed that the business of J&C 
would be transferred to Hamon J&C, which was not yet incorporated at that stage. 
In exchange for the transfer of the business, 7 000 ordinary shares in Hamon J&C 
would be issued to Peel Jnr (the first applicant) and/or other members of the Peel 
Family, as well as Pandela (the third applicant), and 7 000 ordinary shares to Peel 
Snr (the second applicant).5 The total value of the issue would be R14 million.6 In 
exchange for 3 500 ordinary shares in Hamon J&C, Hamon SA would transfer assets 
to Hamon J&C, including the Hamon trade name and trademarks, as well as 
associated business connections. Hamon SA further agreed to purchase the 7 000 
ordinary shares in Hamon J&C that would be issued to the second applicant. The 
result of the implementation of the sale and transfer agreement was that Hamon SA 
held 10 500 ordinary shares in Hamon J&C, while the balance of 7 000 ordinary 
shares was held by the first, third and fourth applicants.7 
The transactions concluded before the formation of Hamon J&C that gave rise to the 
dispute between the applicants and respondents are subsequently discussed. 
On 29 July 2010 the holding company of Hamon SA, Hamon & Cie (International SA) 
(Hamon International; the third respondent) sold 26% of its shares in Hamon SA to 
4  Peel para [9]. 
5  Peel para [13], read with para [9]. 
6  Peel para [13]. 
7  Peel para [14]. 
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two of Hamon SA's employees, November and Mangwana.8 The effect of the sale of 
shares by Hamon International was that November and Mangwana each held 13% 
of Hamon SA's shares. The purpose of this sale of shares was to improve Hamon 
SA's empowerment status in terms of the Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 
2003 (BEE status). The agreements for the sale of shares of Hamon International 
with November and Mangwana respectively provided Hamon International with an 
option to repurchase the shares at any time, on simple request.9 The selling of the 
shares to November and Mangwana took place before the formation of the joint 
venture company and accordingly, before the applicants became shareholders of 
Hamon J&C. Hamon International admitted to terminating these agreements for the 
sale of shares during December 2010.10 According to the applicants the shares were 
simply taken back by Hamon International on 7 January 2011.11 Mangwana reported 
this issue to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on 19 January 2011, 
however, the matter was still under investigation at the time this application was 
argued.12 The taking back of the shares took place after the formation of the joint 
venture company and accordingly, after the applicants became shareholders of 
Hamon J&C. 
The applicants alleged, for several reasons, that Hamon International's conduct 
constituted simulated transactions to artificially improve Hamon SA's BEE status,13 
the respondents admitted that it was an improper BEE transaction, and the Court 
held that it "clearly was not a genuine transaction".14 
Because a substantial part of Hamon J&C's business was sourced from organs of 
state, public entities and other large companies who were concerned about their 
service providers' BEE status,15 the applicants contended that the improper BEE 
8  Peel para [17]. 
9  Peel para [19.2]. 
10  Peel para [29]. 
11  Peel para [19.13]. 
12  Peel para [20]. 
13  Peel para [16], read with para [19]. 
14  Peel para [58]. 
15  Peel paras [21], [57]. 
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transaction had the potential of destroying their business prospects and, accordingly, 
they were exposed to serious business risks for the future.16 
Another contention was that the improper BEE transaction was a material matter 
that was not disclosed to the applicants before the business of J&C was transferred 
to Hamon J&C, which non-disclosure disregarded their interests.17 However, it is 
unclear how the improper BEE transaction could be disclosed to the applicants 
before the business of J&C was transferred to Hamon J&C, as the agreements for 
the sale of shares were terminated, and the shares taken back by Hamon 
International, only after the business of J&C had been transferred to Hamon J&C. 
The applicants' attitude was that the improper BEE transaction was so serious in 
nature that they simply could not be associated with Hamon SA and Hamon 
International.18 They argued that the improper BEE transaction, along with the fact 
that Hamon SA and Hamon International did not take the appropriate measures to 
remedy the conduct, was oppressive.19 Accordingly, the overarching relief sought by 
the applicants was to sever all ties with Hamon SA and Hamon International by 
exercising the oppression remedy,20 and asking the Court to grant the following: 
… an order directing an exchange of shares between the second applicant and 
Hamon SA as envisaged in sec 163(2)(e); and/or directing the restoration of Hamon 
SA by the applicant of a part, alternatively, the whole of the consideration that 
Hamon SA paid for the shares, with conditions as envisaged in sec 163(2)(g); 
and/or varying or setting aside the sale of shares transaction between Hamon SA, 
the second applicant and Hamon J&C and compensating Hamon J&C and/or the 
second applicant, or any other of the applicants as envisaged in sec 163(2)(h); and 
that Hamon SA pay compensation to the second applicant and/or Hamon J&C, as 
envisaged in section 163(2)(j) …21 
  
16  Peel paras [22], [46]. 
17  Peel paras [39], [46]. 
18  Peel paras [16], [22]. 
19  Peel para [55]. 
20  Peel paras [23], [46]. 
21  Peel para [23]. 
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3 The judgment 
The Court made three findings on the facts, relating to the requirements contained 
in section 163(1)(a), on which it based its judgment. It found that it was the 
intention of the parties "that J&C Engineering should benefit from the use of the 
"Hamon" name as well as its alleged goodwill" and, accordingly, that the improper 
BEE transaction caused the applicants to be prejudiced.22 It found the fact that the 
improper BEE transaction was not remedied by the respondents to be oppressive to 
the applicants,23 as the credibility of a company such as Hamon J&C's BEE status 
was vital to ensure ongoing business.24 Finally, the Court found the non-disclosure of 
the improper BEE transaction to be unfairly prejudicial to the applicants and to 
unfairly disregard their interests.25 Although the Court found that "[t]he applicants 
were … exposed to serious business risks especially if the DTI eventually [found] 
that the whole BEE issue was a sham" it did not indicate whether this exposure 
amounted to unfair prejudice, oppression, or a disregard of the applicants' 
interests.26 In other words, the Court's finding that the applicants were exposed to 
serious business risks was not indicated to satisfy any specific result as required in 
section 163(1)(a). 
4 Comments 
4.1 Introduction 
In casu the Court held that "[a] careful consideration of the interpretation given by 
our courts to the provisions of sec 252 of the old Companies Act and the provisions 
in sec 163 of the new Companies Act … shows a continuing intention by the 
legislature to broaden relief in these provisions, rather than to limit them".27 It based 
its finding on the fact that the Act provides for a new ground on which an applicant 
can rely, namely conduct that unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant; the 
22  Peel para [59]. 
23  Peel paras [55], [59]. 
24  Peel para [57]. 
25  Peel paras [55], [59]. 
26  Peel paras [55], [62]. 
27  Peel para [52]; see also Grancy (Pty) Ltd v Manala 2013 3 All SA 111 (SCA) (Grancy) para [26]. 
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fact that locus standi is extended to the directors of the company; the fact that relief 
can now be sought regarding the conduct of a person related to the company; as 
well as the fact that section 163 now contains a wide range of relief that the Court 
can grant.28 
In our opinion, it is important to draw a distinction between the application of 
section 163 and the orders that the Court can make to provide relief in terms of 
subsection (2). Section 163 applies where an applicant can prove that the specified 
statutory criteria provided for in subsection (1) have been satisfied, while subsection 
(2) contains an open-ended list of orders that the Court can make to provide relief 
for a successful applicant. Clearly, the application of section 163 of the Act is wider 
than the application of section 252 of the previous Act. Accordingly, we agree with 
the Court that locus standi is extended to the directors of the company and that 
relief can now be sought regarding the conduct of a person related to the company. 
We also agree that subsection (2) contains a wide range of orders that the Court can 
make to provide relief for a successful applicant. In fact, the relief that can be 
provided in terms of section 163(2) seems to be wider than the relief that could 
have been provided in terms of section 252. For example, in terms of section 
163(2)(f)(i) the Court can make "an order … appointing directors in place of or in 
addition to all or any of the directors then in office". This power was apparently 
excluded under section 252 of the previous Act.29 However, it should be noted that 
the relief that could be provided in terms of section 252(3) of the previous Act was, 
just like the list of orders provided for in section 163(2) of the Act, open-ended. 
Accordingly, the fact that some of the orders listed in section 163(2) of the Act (for 
example, the order listed in par (f)(i)) effectively extend the powers of the Court to 
grant relief in terms of the oppression remedy does not mean that none of the 
orders listed in subsection (2) could be made in terms of section 252 of the previous 
Act. More importantly, although we agree that "[a] careful consideration of the 
interpretation given by our courts to the provisions of sec 252 of the old Companies 
Act and the provisions in sec 163 of the new Companies Act … shows a continuing 
28  Peel para [53]. 
29  See Delport et al Henochsberg 572, with reference to Ex parte Avondzon Trust (Edms) Bpk 1968 
1 SA 340 (T) 342-343. 
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intention by the legislature to broaden relief in these provisions, rather than to limit 
them",30 we deem it necessary to stress the fact that this does not mean that the 
oppression remedy is available to applicants in circumstances where the 
requirements of section 163(1) are not satisfied. The oppression remedy is available 
only if an act or omission by a company or a person related to the company has had 
a result that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the 
interests of a shareholder or a director of the company; or if the carrying on of the 
business of the company, or the exercising of the powers of a director or a 
prescribed officer of the company is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to a 
shareholder or a director of the company. Relief cannot be granted in terms of 
subsection (2) where the requirements of subsection (1) – the specified statutory 
criteria - have not been satisfied. 
In Louw v Nel31 (Louw), regarding the application of section 252 of the previous Act, 
the Court held that "[a]n applicant … must establish the following: that the particular 
act or omission has been committed, or that the affairs of the company are being 
conducted in the manner alleged and that such act or omission or conduct of the 
company's affairs is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or some part of 
the members of the company; the nature of the relief that must be granted to bring 
to an end the matters complained of; and that it is just and equitable that such relief 
be granted" and that "the court's jurisdiction to make an order does not arise until 
the specified statutory criteria have been satisfied".32 Similarly, in Count Gotthard SA 
Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd33 (Count Gotthard), regarding the application 
of section 163 of the Act, the Court held that "the Applicant would be entitled to 
relief in terms of s 163 if he can prove ... (1) any act or omission on the part of ... 
[the respondent] ... (2) which had a result or consequence ... (3) which was 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded the interests of the 
Applicant".34 These requirements, as well as the requirement that the applicant must 
30  Peel para [52]. 
31  Louw v Nel 2011 2 SA 172 (SCA) (Louw). 
32  Louw paar [23]. 
33  Count Gotthard SA Pilati v Witfontein Game Farm (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 All SA 190 (GNP) (Count 
Gotthard). 
34  Count Gotthard para [17.7]. 
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be a shareholder or a director of the company, as envisaged in subsection (1), are 
the specified statutory criteria that must be satisfied.  
In our opinion the Court erred in relying on the fact that locus standi is extended to 
the directors of a company and that relief can now be sought regarding the conduct 
of a person related to the company, as well as the fact that relief that can be 
provided in terms of section 163(2) seems to be wider than the relief that could 
have been provided in terms of section 252, to justify such a broad approach to the 
application of the oppression remedy, that even non-compliance with some of the 
specified statutory criteria did not preclude the applicants from being successful in 
their application in terms of section 163. 
The statutory criteria specified in section 163, as well as the question of whether the 
criteria was satisfied in Peel, are subsequently discussed. 
4.2 Brief analysis of section 163 
A shareholder or a director of a company has to prove that an act or omission by his 
or her company, or a person related to his or her company, has had a result that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to him or her, or a result that unfairly disregards his 
or her interests (section 163(1)(a)). Alternatively, the shareholder or director has to 
prove that the carrying on of the business of his or her company (section 163(1)(b)), 
or the exercising of the powers of a director or a prescribed officer of his or her 
company (section 163(1)(c)), is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to him or her, or 
unfairly disregards his or her interests. It is interesting to note that, unlike an act or 
omission that must have had a result that unfairly disregards the applicant's 
interests, the carrying on of the business of the company, or the exercising of the 
powers of a director or a prescribed officer, need not have had such a result, but it 
must be conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that 
unfairly disregards the applicant's interests. 
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4.3  Applicant 
It is clear from the wording of section 163(1) that only a shareholder or a director of 
a company has locus standi to exercise the oppression remedy. 
Some authors contend that the wording of section 163(1) implies that an applicant 
may exercise the oppression remedy if the conduct complained of occurred before 
he or she became a shareholder or a director of the company.35 While we agree that 
section 163(1) does not specifically provide that an applicant has to be a shareholder 
or a director of the company when the conduct occurs, we submit that it is not 
settled that this section should be interpreted to provide that the oppression remedy 
may be exercised by an applicant who was not yet a shareholder or a director of the 
company when the conduct occurred. In fact, in our opinion section 163(1) should 
rather be interpreted to limit locus standi to shareholders or directors who have 
been such at the time the conduct complained of occurred. Such an interpretation 
should ensure that the floodgates are not opened for applications in terms of section 
163 and that the section itself is not used as a means of oppression. In other words, 
we are of the opinion that the Court's jurisdiction in terms of section 163 should be 
controlled, just as the Court's jurisdiction in terms of section 252 of the previous Act 
had to "be carefully controlled in order to prevent the section from itself being used 
as a means of oppression".36 Further, "under s 252(3) [of the previous Act] the court 
is bound to consider not only the interests of the warring shareholders but also 
those of shareholders who have stood apart and the interests of the company 
itself";37 and we are of the opinion that the same applies to section 163 of the Act. 
So, while we agree that "the provisions in sec 163 of the new Companies Act … 
[show] a continuing intention by the legislature to broaden relief in these provisions, 
rather than to limit them",38 as stated above, this does not mean that locus standi 
35  Cassim et al Company Law 759 n 11. 
36  Blackman, Jooste and Everingham Companies Act 9-4, quoted by the Court in Louw para [31] 
and Grancy para [32]. 
37  Bayly v Knowles 2010 4 SA 548 (SCA) para [25]; see also the reference to this principle in Peel 
para [44]. 
38  Peel para [52]; see also Grancy para [26]. 
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should be extended further than it has already been extended by section 163, in 
comparison with section 252 of the previous Act. 
Although, prima facie, it may seem as though Peel is by implication authority for the 
contention that a shareholder or a director who wants to exercise the oppression 
remedy need not have been a shareholder or a director at the time of the conduct 
as, in casu, the applicants were never shareholders or directors of Hamon SA or 
Hamon International, and they were neither shareholders, nor directors of Hamon 
J&C when Hamon International sold 26 percent of its shares in Hamon SA to 
November and Mangwana but, nevertheless, succeeded in their application in terms 
of section 163. It should be noted, however, that the conduct complained of had not 
been completed by the time the joint venture company was incorporated and the 
applicants became shareholders of Hamon J&C (during October 2010), as the 
agreements for the sale of shares were terminated during December 2010 and the 
shares were taken back by Hamon International on 7 January 2011. In Count 
Gotthard the Court agreed that in order to be able to exercise the oppression 
remedy "the act must be completed".39 Therefore, in our opinion, the applicants 
were shareholders when the conduct occurred. Accordingly, in our opinion Peel 
should not be regarded as authority for the contention that a shareholder or a 
director who wants to exercise the oppression remedy need not have been a 
shareholder or a director of the company at the time of the conduct.  
Regarding section 252 of the previous Act, in Garden Province Investment v Aleph 
(Pty) Ltd40 (Aleph) the Court held that an applicant had to prove that the conduct, as 
well as the effect of the conduct, was unfairly prejudicial to him or her. In other 
words, under section 252 an applicant had to be a member of the company at the 
time of the conduct. 
Accordingly, we submit that it is still an open question whether the oppression 
remedy can be exercised by an applicant who was not a shareholder or a director of 
the company at the time of the conduct. 
39  Count Gotthard para [17.6]. 
40  Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd 1979 2 SA 525 (D) (Aleph) 531. 
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4.4 Conduct 
The conduct complained of in casu was that a person related to Hamon J&C, namely 
Hamon International, conducted an improper BEE transaction, that this transaction 
was not disclosed to the applicants before the business of J&C was transferred to 
Hamon J&C, and that the conduct was not remedied by the respondents. 
As stated earlier, the applicants contended that the improper BEE transaction had 
the potential of destroying their business prospects and, accordingly, that they had 
been exposed to serious business risks for the future.41 Further, they contended that 
the improper BEE transaction was a material matter that was not disclosed to them 
before the business of J&C was transferred to Hamon J&C, which non-disclosure 
disregarded their interests.42 
While the improper BEE transaction, together with the fact that it was not remedied, 
seems to constitute conduct for the purpose of section 163(1), the applicants' 
contention that the improper BEE transaction was not disclosed to them prior to the 
transfer of the business of J&C to Hamon J&C makes it seem as though they wanted 
to rely on a material misrepresentation as the basis for the contract (the sale and 
transfer agreement) to be rescinded. The fact that the Court granted the relief as 
prayed for in the notice of motion, by ordering the restitution of shares, the 
cancellation of all licensing and shareholder agreements, and the resignation of all 
the directors appointed by Hamon SA to the board of directors of the joint venture 
company, and that the name of the joint venture company be changed to J&C 
Engineering (Pty) Ltd, further makes it seem as though the applicants wanted, and 
the Court granted, restitutio in integrum. It should be noted that the respondents 
also argued that "[t]he real complaint of the applicants … [was] that they … 
[believed] they ha[d] done a poor commercial deal by contracting with the second 
and third respondents".43 Accordingly, in our opinion it would have been more 
appropriate for the applicants to have made use of a remedy in terms of the law of 
contract than to have made use of the oppression remedy. As indicated below, we 
41  Peel paras [22], [46]. 
42  Peel paras [39], [46]. 
43  Peel para [32]. 
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are of the opinion that the applicants should not have been successful in their 
application in terms of section 163. 
4.5 Result 
Section 252(1) of the previous Act did not refer to the term "result", as is the case in 
section 163(1)(a) of the Act. However, regarding section 252 of the previous Act, in 
Aleph44 the Court held that an applicant had to prove that the conduct complained 
of, as well as the effect (the result) of the conduct, was unfairly prejudicial to him or 
her. Accordingly, the result-requirement of section 163(1) is not an additional 
requirement. It should also be noted that neither para (b) nor para (c) specifically 
refers to the term "result". In our opinion, the purpose of the reference to the term 
"result" in section 163(1)(a) is to highlight the fact that the company's conduct must 
have already had a detrimental effect on the applicant when an application is made 
to Court. The result of the conduct complained of should have impacted on the 
interests of the applicant. In Kudumane Investment Holdings Ltd v Northern Cape 
Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd45 (Kudumane) it was held that the concept of 
interests is much wider than the rights of an applicant. A shareholder's "interests" 
flow from the rights of a patrimonial nature which are attached to the share held by 
that shareholder.46 The Court in Count Gotthard47 appears to have given the word 
"interests" a wider meaning, stating that "interests" do not have to flow from the 
rights stipulated in the Memorandum of Incorporation but may also flow from an 
understanding that forms the basis of their relationship. 
While we agree with the Court in Kudumane that "[s]ection 163 does not require all 
possible results to have eventuated" and that "[o]nly one result – 'a result' – is 
required which meets the requirements of the section",48 we do not agree that lack 
of confidence and uncertainty is a result that satisfies the requirements of section 
44  Aleph 531. 
45  Kudumane Investment Holdings Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese Company (Pty) Ltd 2012 4 All 
SA 203 (GSJ) (Kudumane) para [58]. 
46  Utopia Vakansie-Oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 3 SA 148 (A) 181. 
47  Count Gotthard para [17.4]. 
48  Kudumane para [55]. 
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163(1).49 Similarly, we do not agree with the Court in Peel that "a serious business 
risk" is a result that satisfies the requirements of section 163(1). Moreover, the Court 
held that "[t]he applicants were and are exposed to serious business risks especially 
if the DTI eventually [finds] that the whole BEE issue was a sham".50 It seems as 
though the Court did not find that the applicants were exposed to a serious business 
risk, but that they would be exposed to a serious business risk if the DTI eventually 
found that the BEE transaction was improper. As stated earlier, the Court also did 
not specifically indicate that this exposure constituted prejudice, oppression, or a 
disregard of the applicants' interests.51 The Court's finding implies that not only is a 
serious business risk a result that satisfies the requirements of section 163, but also 
that the same is true for the mere possibility of a serious business risk. 
We submit that uncertainty whether a specific event may materialise or not cannot 
be regarded as a result which satisfies the requirements of section 163(1)(a). A risk 
is not an eventuality; it implies that something may or may not happen. Claiming 
that a risk is serious does not change the fact that something still may or may not 
happen. The possibility of a risk is removed even further from an eventuality. In 
casu, the Court effectively held that the applicants may or may not lose business in 
the future if the DTI found that the BEE transaction was improper, which it may or 
may not do. So, even if the DTI finds that the BEE transaction was improper, it is 
still possible for the applicants not to lose any business. 
4.6 Detriment 
If uncertainty is held to be enough to satisfy the result-requirement of section 
163(1), by implication an applicant need not prove oppression, unfair prejudice, or 
any unfair disregard of his or her interests as required by section 163(1) either, as 
potential oppression, potential unfair prejudice, or any potential unfair disregard of 
his or her interests will suffice. Clearly, this is what happened in Peel, where the 
Court found that the applicants had a reasonable expectation to profit financially 
from their association with the reputable trade name and marks of Hamon SA and 
49  See also Beukes and Swart 2012 SA Merc LJ 470. 
50  Peel para [55]. 
51  See Peel paras [55], [62]. 
1703 
                                        
HGJ BEUKES AND WJC SWART  PER / PELJ 2014(17)4 
Hamon International, but because of the improper BEE transaction this expectation 
was destroyed and, accordingly, the applicants were prejudiced.52 
It is clear from the wording of section 163(1) that an applicant has to prove that the 
result of the conduct complained of is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to him or 
her, or that the result of the conduct unfairly disregards his or her interests. Further, 
this detriment has to exist when an applicant applies to Court. In casu, the 
applicants failed to prove that there was any oppression, unfair prejudice, or any 
unfair disregard of their interests at the time of the application. Accordingly, in our 
opinion the application in terms of section 163, as well as the Court's finding that the 
applicants were prejudiced by the improper BEE transaction, and that the failure to 
remedy the conduct was oppressive toward them, were premature. 
Another important issue that should be kept in mind is that an applicant must 
experience detriment in his or her capacity as a shareholder or director of the 
company. In Count Gotthard the Court held that conduct "must result in unfair 
prejudice to [the applicant] in his capacity as a shareholder".53 In Peel, even if the 
risk would materialise, this result would directly affect the interests of Hamon J&C, 
but only indirectly those of the applicants. As "[s]ection 163 protects the interests of 
a shareholder or director … [while] s 165 protects the legal interests of the 
company",54 an application in terms of section 165 of the Act to protect the interests 
of Hamon J&C would have been more suitable under the circumstances. 
5 Conclusion 
As stated earlier, in our opinion Peel should not be regarded as authority for the 
contention that a shareholder or a director who wants to exercise the oppression 
remedy need not have been a shareholder or a director of the company at the time 
of the conduct, as the conduct complained of in casu had not been completed by the 
time the joint venture company was incorporated and, accordingly, the applicants 
were shareholders of Hamon J&C when the conduct occurred. 
52  See Peel para [59]. 
53  Count Gotthard para [17.6]. 
54  See Beukes and Swart 2012 SA Merc LJ 472. 
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If section 163(1) of the Act had not extended its application by incorporating the 
conduct of "a related person", the applicants would not have been able to prove that 
the conduct-requirement had been satisfied, as it was not an act or omission of 
Hamon J&C that resulted in the applicants experiencing oppression or unfair 
prejudice, but the act by the holding company of Hamon SA, Hamon International, 
of selling 26 percent of its shares in Hamon SA to November and Mangwana and 
then terminating these agreements for the sale of shares. Thus, Peel is another 
example of how the conduct of a person related to a company can expose the 
company to an application in terms of section 163 (see also Kudumane) and how 
important it is for a company in a group to assess how the conduct of other 
companies in the group will impact on it.  
We submit that two of the requirements of section 163(1) had not been satisfied in 
Peel, namely the result-requirement and the detriment-requirement. 
As stated earlier, we are of the opinion that uncertainty that there will be a result is 
not a result and, accordingly, that the Court incorrectly found the applicants to have 
proven that the result-requirement of section 163(1) had been satisfied. It should be 
noted, however, that we do not question the fact that the oppression remedy can be 
utilised to ensure that an applicant is not exposed to "further risks", as was the 
situation in Grancy.55 However, at least "a risk" must have materialised in order to 
satisfy the result-requirement of section 163(1). As stated earlier, we agree with the 
Court in Kudumane that "[s]ection 163 does not require all possible results to have 
eventuated" and that "[o]nly one result – ;a result; – is required which meets the 
requirements of the section".56 
As the result-requirement of section 163(1) was effectively ignored, the applicants 
did not have to prove oppression, unfair prejudice, or an unfair disregard of their 
interests. Accordingly, the unproven contention that their expectation to profit 
financially from their association with Hamon SA and Hamon International had been 
55  See Grancy para [15]. 
56  Kudumane para [55]. 
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destroyed was enough to convince the Court that the detriment-requirement of 
section 163(1) had been satisfied. 
Had the Court not allowed the applicants to rely on section 163, they would not have 
been without remedy. As indicated earlier, the dispute between the parties could 
and should have been resolved by making use of a remedy in terms of the law of 
contract. The applicants could have been provided relief by the Court granting 
restitutio in integrum which, as indicated earlier, the applicants seem to have 
wanted and the Court seems to have granted. However, even where an applicant 
has no other remedy section 163 should not be extended beyond its statutorily 
intended reach. 
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